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The paper provides a summary measure of the Uruguay Round tariff reduction commitments in 
the European Union and the United States, using the Mercantilistic Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(MTRI) as the tariff aggregator. We compute the index for agricultural commodity aggregates 
assuming a specific (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) functional form for import demand. The 
levels of the MTRI under the actual commitments of the Uruguay Round are computed and 
compared with two hypothetical cases, the Swiss Formula leading to a 36 percent average 
decrease in tariffs and a uniform 36 percent reduction of each tariff. This makes it possible to infer 
how reducing tariff dispersion would help improve market access in future trade agreements.  
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One major achievement of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) was the 
prohibition of quantitative barriers to agricultural trade, requiring that all such trade take place 
under a tariff-only regime (except for some specific derogations including tariff quotas).  Each 
World Trade Organization (WTO) member established a base schedule, containing both pre-
existing and new tariffs resulting from the conversion of non-tariff measures, following an 
international commodity classification scheme (referred to as the Harmonised System or HS).  
The adoption of a tariffs-only approach for agriculture was a sweeping reform that went a long 
way toward subjecting agricultural trade to the same disciplines applied to other traded goods.  
However, many authors have pointed out that the URAA agreement achieved only minor 
reductions in protection (Hathaway and Ingco, 1995; Tangermann, 1995).  One reason for this 
conclusion is the rather lax method of conversion of non-tariff measures into their tariff 
equivalents.  It has also often been pointed out that member countries were allowed a significant 
flexibility in the allocation of tariff rate cuts.  For instance, the tariff cutting formula was based on 
a simple average.  Thus, by making rather large percentage cuts in low tariffs, or in tariffs for 
commodities that do not compete with domestic production, countries could meet the overall 36% 
average objective with only minimal cuts in politically sensitive tariffs.  The present negotiations 
under the so called Doha Development Agenda raise concerns that similar dilution of the 
commitments may occur.  For that reason, a number of countries have proposed measures to 
ensure substantial improvements in market access, using for example a "Swiss formula", under 
which the level of tariff cut is a function of the level of the initial tariff.  The July 31 2004 Council 
Decision of the WTO states that “progressivity in tariff reduction will be achieved through deeper 




practical modalities of these cuts are still a matter of negotiation, it is foreseen that a system of 
bands with different thresholds will be used.  Simulations show that such a system of bands result 
in an tariff structure that is very close to the one obtained by the Swiss Formula.  There is some 
uncertainty, though, about the actual effect of such “harmonizing” formulas leading to a cut in the 
average tariff, compared to commitments based on a radial cut (i.e. all tariff lines cut by the same 
percentage), or on an average cut as implemented in the Uruguay Round.  This is one of the issues 
that we address in this paper. 
All studies on market access run into some major difficulties linked to data availability and 
international inconsistencies in classifications.  These empirical aspects are perhaps the main 
reason why the various studies differ so much when measuring the degree of market access in one 
given country.
1  However, methodological issues are also important.  To assess the overall effect 
of an uneven reduction in a large number of tariffs, one faces the problem of finding the 
appropriate index.  Recent developments in the theory of index numbers have led to new 
indicators of the aggregate impact of trade policy, such as the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) 
and the Mercantilistic Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI).  The MTRI, introduced by Anderson 
and Neary (2003), consists in estimating the uniform tariff that yields the same aggregate volume 
of imports as the original vector of (non-uniform) tariffs across a number of imports.  We believe 
that using the trade volume as the reference standard is appropriate in the context of trade 
negotiations, since countries involved in the negotiation are interested in the trade volume 
displacement due to changes in tariffs.  Indeed, one of the pillars of the WTO is the “principle of 
                                                      
1 For example, estimates of the EU average agricultural tariff for agriculture after the Uruguay Round range between 




reciprocity” that can be interpreted as equivalent import volume expansion (see Bagwell and 
Staiger 2000). Our contribution is the following: 
-  First, assuming a specific functional form for the import demand, we address the problem of 
assessing the tariff reduction commitments undertaken by the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (US) under the URAA.  In order to do so, we compute the MTRI in 1995 (the 
first year of the implementation of the URAA) and in 2001 (the end of the implementation 
period) for 20 agricultural commodity aggregates. 
-  Second, we compare the effect of the URAA on tariffs with an alternative tariff reduction 
scheme whereby high tariffs are cut more dramatically than low tariffs. 
-  Third, we measure the magnitude of the “dilution effect” that could have resulted from the 
distribution of large and minimal cuts across tariff lines.  This is done by comparing the 
URAA tariff cuts with a uniform (i.e., radial) reduction in tariffs. 
-  Fourth, we compare an index based on economic theory, such as the MTRI, to other a-
theoretic, ad hoc indexes of tariff reductions, such as the simple arithmetic average of tariff 
cuts adopted in the URAA.  Our contention is that much of the empirical evidence based on 
these indexes is inherently flawed. 
Finally, we compute the level of MTRI and not simply the relative rates of change between two 
points in time as in Bureau, Fulponi and Salvatici (2000), hereafter BFS.  Our results provide not 
only a measure of the effect of an agreement (i.e. changes), but also a measure of the overall level 
of protection across countries, both before and after the changes that take place on the actual 




General Equilibrium (CGE) model is a theoretically consistent approach, but which does not 
allow the degree of detail sufficient to work with the actual commitments on agricultural tariffs.  
Here, we develop a method in order to construct an approximation of the MTRI that makes it 
possible to handle the present EU and US tariff structure, e.g. some 1500 tariff lines in agriculture.  
Our results provide indicators of the degree of market access for 20 aggregated agricultural 
products, which are consistent with a data set widely used by trade practitioners, the GTAP 
dataset (Hertel 1997).  
2. Methodology 
The practical and theoretical deficiencies of traditional tariff indexes, such as the simple or the 
trade-weighted average tariff, are well known (Laird and Yeats 1988; Anderson and Neary 2003).  
Indexes such as the TRI and the MTRI have more solid theoretical foundations, although the 
definition of such indexes relies on several restrictive assumptions, including the existence of a 
competitive equilibrium, a single representative consumer, and fixed world prices (i.e., the small 
country assumption).  Because they are derived from the balance of trade function, the TRI and 
the MTRI synthesize the overall effect of trade policy on the economy.
2 
The assumption of fixed (exogenous) world prices is questionable, since our empirical analysis 
deals with US and EU, two major traders on the world agricultural market.  However, the small 
country assumption helps to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the indexes, ruling out 
                                                      
2 The balance of trade function summarizes the outcome of and the consumption sector, the production sector and the 
public behavior by including tariff revenues in the trade expenditure function. Equilibrium of the economy is 
consistent with a balance of trade that equals an exogenous income. Anderson and Neary (1996) and Martin (1997) 




counterintuitive "second best" results and is consistent with a ceteris paribus approach (Bureau 
and Salvatici, 2004).
3   
The most satisfactory solution would be to compute the MTRI as the (scalar) tariff that would 
yield the same volume of imports as the initial tariff structure using a CGE model (Anderson and 
Neary, 2003).  However, the limitations in the number of commodities in CGE models require a 
substantial aggregation of trade flows and tariffs.
4  Agricultural tariffs vary widely even within a 
single product aggregate (e.g., within a single chapter of the HS classification of the United 
Nations).  In addition, tariff reductions under the URAA were taken on the basis of a very detailed 
list of items, and the magnitude of tariff cut also varies substantially within a product category 
(Gibson et al. 2001).  Therefore, a significant amount of information on the level of tariff 
dispersion (and on the change in dispersion over time) is lost when aggregating tariffs data up to 
the level that is consistent with CGE models aggregates.  In order to be able to take into account 
the impacts of changes occurring on a very large number of finely differentiated tariff lines, we 
build on the insights of Bach and Martin (2001) who assume a specific functional for import 
demand.  Their methodology, which aims to develop tariff aggregators for both the expenditure 
and tariff revenue components of CGE models, can be adapted in order to compute the MTRI. 
                                                      
3 Anderson and Neary (2003), argue (footnote 8) that , "there is a rationale for a ceteris paribus trade restrictiveness 
index that fixes world prices even when these prices are in fact endogenous". Such a "rationale" may be represented 
by the fact that, by keeping world prices constant, we focus on the component of protection explained by national 
policies, and not by the degree of market power of the country. 
4 Anderson and Neary (1999) use Anderson’s (1998) CGE model which is unusually disaggregated as far as the trade 
structure is concerned.  However, even this model relies on a 4-digit HS classification, while the official WTO tariff 




2.1. Mercantilistic Trade Restrictiveness Index 
Our starting point is the trade behaviour of an economy under perfect competition.  When tariffs 
are imposed, government behaviour in collecting tariff revenues and redistributing them in lump 
sum fashion needs to be incorporated in the representation of the economy.  Both government and 
private behaviours are summarised by the balance of trade (BoT) function B (p, u, z).  The BoT 
represents the external budget constraint, and is equal to the net transfer required to reach a given 
level of aggregate domestic welfare u, for a given set of domestic prices p, and factor endowments 
vector z.  It also summarises the three possible sources of funds for procuring imports: earnings 
from exports, earnings from tariff revenues and international transfers. 
The MTRI relies on the idea of evaluating trade policy using trade volume as the reference 
standard.  The MTRI is defined in terms of the uniform tariff τ which yields the same volume (at 
world prices) of tariff-restricted imports as the initial vector of (non-uniform) tariffs.  This can be 
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where  * p  denotes the international price vector of the N goods k = (1,…,N) and M
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where Im denotes the uncompensated (Marshallian) import demand function and p is the domestic 




(at world prices) as the one resulting from the uneven tariff structure, denoted by the N-
dimensional tariff vector t whose elements are  k t .  That is,  














0 * , 1 * , 1 * τ .       ( 3 )  
The MTRI can be computed by solving equation (3) for τ .
5 
2.2. Empirical Estimation of the MTRI 
Having defined the MTRI, for the empirical implementation we follow Bach and Martin (2001) 
modelling demand through a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional form.  This 
function imposes well-known restrictive assumptions on separability.  Nonetheless it has several 
empirical advantages that explain its use in modelling import demand (Winters, 1984).  Gorman 
(1959) has shown that if the utility function is homogeneously separable, commodities may be 
consistently aggregated.  That is, one may form composite commodities which may be treated in 
the same manner as the primary commodities.  Accordingly, we assume that the overall basket of 
goods can be partitioned into J aggregates denoted j=1,…J, and the utility function of the 
representative consumer can be written as: 
() ( ) () J J x u x u U ,..., 1 1 φ = ,         ( 4 )  
where φ is continous, twice differentiable, and strictly quasi concave and the ui are continuous, 
twice differentiable functions, homogeneous of degree one (Lloyd, 1975).  When focusing on the 
                                                      
5 The MTRI derived from equation (3) provides a measure of trade restrictiveness relative to a free trade reference, 
while BFS computed a “uniform tariff surcharge” measuring changes in the tariff structure from the initial 




J sectoral MTRIs, a convenient (albeit restrictive) assumption is to assume φ  to be a Cobb-
Douglas function (implying that the expenditure function is also a Cobb-Douglas one in prices 
with utility entering multiplicatively).  In such a case, we avoid the issue of allocation of 
consumer expenditure across sectors, which in a general equilibrium models, is affected by tariffs 
within a particular aggregate j (Bureau and Salvatici, 2004). 
In our application, we assume that uj is a CES function in xj.  Since the import volume function is 
homogenous of degree zero in the prices of traded goods, the MTRI cannot be calculated (any 
uniform tax would be equivalent to free trade in terms of imports).
6  This difficulty of evaluating 
the MTRI can be circumvented if i) there is a designated "reference good", so that the price 
vectors refer to prices relative to such a good; or if ii) we use the price of the least distorted 
imported good in each sector as the numéraire, avoiding the need to include the domestic good in 
the subexpenditure function.  Since there are some sectors (such as dairy, sugar, beef in the EU, 
for example) in which all products face a strictly positive tariffs, using the least distorted good in 
each sector as the reference would not allow to draw meaningful comparisons across sectors 
and/or countries.  We use the popular Armington (1969) assumption that imports are imperfect 
substitutes of domestic goods, and we solve the problem by taking the domestic good as the 
numéraire (Bach and Martin, 2001).
7  We partition the consumption vector xj within the jth group 
                                                      
6 More generally, Neary (1998) shows how the failure to select a reference untaxed good leads to misleading results 
in the theory of trade policy. 
7 The assumption that the domestic good is numeraire does not imply that it is exogenous.  However, endogeneity 
would require specifying market clearing to allow price determination.  Here, our goal is to develop a methodology 
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1  the elasticity of substitution within the j group, the expenditure devoted to 
each aggregate j is  
() () () j
i
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, .       ( 6 )  
The parameters  ij β  can be calibrated to the initial values of the expenditure shares in the base 
data, when all domestic prices are set to 1.  After deriving the indirect utility function by inverting 
equation (6), the Marshallian demand functions of each of the i=1,.., Nj
 -1 imported goods can be 
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Denoting Pj the price index that corresponds to the denominator of the right-hand side, the import 

























*      with i=1,…, Nj
 –1.     ( 8 )  
When the initial total expenditure 
0
j e  (expenditures on both domestic and imports in j) is used in 




The MTRI uniform tariff equivalent  j τ  for each aggregate j is found by setting the value of the 
import volume function with the uniform tariff equivalent equal to the initial value of imports 
(evaluated at world prices), 
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where 
0
ij I  are the volume of imports in the initial period (i.e., 1995 or 2001 in our numerical 
applications), and 
τ
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The uniform tariff equivalents for each aggregate commodity j are found using an optimization 
routine in the GAMS package (Brooke et al. 1998), solving for  j τ  in equations (9) and (10).  
The indicators  j τ  are by themselves relevant for the analysis of trade policy.  In addition, the  j τ  
can be used as aggregate tariffs in any trade model with a commodity aggregation and an import 
demand structure which is consistent with our assumptions.  However, it must be acknowledged 
that they are only an approximation of the “true” (i.e., general equilibrium) MTRI tariff 
equivalent, since using initial total expenditure 
0
j e  in equation (9) we ignore the income effect due 
to the change in tariff revenue.  In our application, dealing with products that are characterised by 
low income elasticities in developed countries, we do not expect this to be a significant issue.
8 
                                                      
8 Beghin, Bureau and Park (2003) introduce the full expansion effects consistent with general equilibrium in their 




One may expect that the computation of an aggregate (i.e., for the whole agricultural sector) 
MTRI tariff equivalent could be easily performed introducing an upper-level demand system.  
However, the requirement of a reference untaxed good for the computation of the MTRI tariff 
aggregator makes the computation of the same index at different levels of aggregation a tricky 
issue.  As a matter of fact, if the numeraire is a domestic good, the price (and quantity) index to 
be used at the upper level would include both domestic and imported goods, and this would make 
the computation of an upper-level tariff aggregator meaningless.  As a consequence, in order to 
compute an MTRI tariff equivalent for the entire dataset, we define it as the uniform tariffτ that 
would keep the overall (i.e., on all j=1,..,J sectors) import volume equal to the initial value.  This 
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2.3. Dataset 
The volumes of imports are taken directly from the respective US and EU datasets (US 
International Trade Commission and Eurostat’s Comext data).  The Schedule XX that the 
European Union and the United States submitted to the WTO provides the base and bound tariffs 
at the 8-digit level of the HS classification.  The URAA schedule therefore provides information 
on tariffs in 1995 (that is, after the Uruguay Round tariffication process) and in 2001 and onwards 
(that is, after the implementation of the mandatory 36 percent average reduction in tariffs).  The 
domestic prices are constructed by multiplying the world price p* by the ad valorem tariff 




of market access focuses only on changes in the tariffs ceteris paribus, and is not affected by 
exogenous price variations (see BFS, 2000 for details on the data set). 
In this paper, the focus of the analysis is on the tariff reduction commitments. That is, we ignore 
tariff rate quotas.  The EU tariff schedule includes 1,764 tariff lines, while the US schedule 
includes 1,377 tariff lines (excluding in quota tariffs).  Both the EU and the US apply their bound 
tariffs on products traded in a Most Favored Nation (MFN) framework.  That is, using the URAA 
schedules as a source of information on tariffs gives a good image of the actual tariff structure, 
although lower tariffs are applied in the framework of preferential agreements that we did not 
consider here.  For purposes of calculation, we converted specific tariffs into ad valorem 
equivalents, following the same conventions as in BFS (2000). 
The elasticities of substitution  j σ  that match the list of aggregates are taken from the GTAP 
dataset (Dimanaran and McDougall, 2002).  This comprehensive dataset is widely used in applied 
analysis, and researchers might be interested in tariff aggregates that match the GTAP 
classification for simulation purposes.  Moreover, the conversion tables from detailed tariff 
structures to the GTAP sectors are fully available, which makes it possible to aggregate the very 
detailed list of tariffs of the URAA Schedule into a restricted number of products that correspond 
to the GTAP system of classification.  Finally, the data set provides the information that is 
necessary for distinguishing between expenditures on domestic products imports for the various 
aggregates.  
There is little justification for using the GTAP elasticities.  It actually is quite bothersome that 
these elasticities are the same for the two countries (Table 1). However, estimation of these 




this work.  Rather, we undertook sensitivity tests to examine the effects of different elasticity 
values on the measurement of MTRI uniform tariffs: the results are presented in Section 6. 
The original GTAP data set distinguishes J=20 agricultural and food aggregate products.  In order 
to include non-food commodities listed in the URAA schedules (mainly agricultural goods listed 
in chapters 29 to 53 of the HS classification) we defined an extra aggregate.  We ignore one 
GTAP sector (raw milk) because there is no trade for the corresponding commodity.  Overall, we 
aggregated 1,764 tariff lines in the EU (1,377 tariff lines in the US) at the 8-digit level of the HS 
classification up to 20 aggregate products described in Table 1.  It is noteworthy that the number 
of tariff lines in each commodity aggregate is very uneven.  Table 1 shows, for example that there 
are only three tariff lines in the aggregate “paddy rice,” while the aggregate “fruits and vegetable” 
tariff includes 183 tariff lines listed in the EU schedule. 
3. Measures of Market Access Prior to the Uruguay Round Agreement 
The computation of the MTRI uniform tariff equivalent  j τ  provides an estimate of the trade 
restrictiveness of the actual tariff structure.  It is calculated for the year 1995 for both the EU and 
the US, making it possible to compare the trade effect of the tariff structures prior to 
implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments.   
The structure of bound tariffs in the EU and the US differs in several aspects (Table 2)  The 
average non-weighted base tariff was 9.7 percent (12.7 percent if we focus only on the items with 
a nonzero tariff) in the US, while in the EU the average tariffs were 26.7 percent (31.4 percent, 
respectively).  In most sectors, the EU average tariff is larger than the US average tariff, the gap 




average tariff is usually larger than the non-weighted average, while it is generally the opposite in 
the US.  A trade-weighted average tariff that is smaller than the non-weighted one can result from 
prohibitive tariffs or may simply mean that larger tariffs are set on commodities whose demand is 
particularly elastic.  This suggests that higher tariffs are set on sensitive products, in the sense that 
the government is willing to protect domestic production from imports, as is the case in the US 
dairy sector.  On the other hand, the trade-weighted average is larger than the non-weighted 
average tariff when low tariffs are set on products whose demand is structurally limited, either 
because these are niche market products (e.g., processed products, peculiar types of fruits, 
beverages, and condiments in the EU), or because local producers are competitive (e.g., pig meat 
and poultry meat).  This may also mean that higher tariffs are set on goods with a relatively 
inelastic demand for imports.  
4. Comparison between the MTRI and A-Theoretic Indicators 
Table 2 shows significant differences between the MTRI and the non-weighted tariff average. 
This is not surprising, since the non-weighted tariff average bears little relationship with 
theoretically sound indexes like the MTRI or the TRI.  On the other hand, the values for the trade-
weighted average tariffs are often quite close to those given by the MTRI tariff.  This empirical 
finding converges with those of Anderson and Neary (2003) and Bach and Martin (2001) who 
show that the trade-weighted average tariff is a linear approximation to the tariff aggregator based 
on the expenditure function.  In other terms, the trade-weighted average tariff plays the same role 
as the Laspeyres price index in consumer theory, providing a fixed-weight approximation that 
underestimates the “true” height of tariffs because it neglects substitution induced by tariff 




In the particular case of a CES aggregator function, the trade-weighted average tariff corresponds 
to constant expenditure shares.  Constant shares correspond to the special case of a Cobb-Douglas 
subutility function, where  j σ =1.  In such a case, we have the following result (proofs of 
propositions are given in the Appendix). 
PROPOSITION 1. In the base equilibrium (that is, with all domestic prices equal to 1), the MTRI 
uniform tariff coincides with the trade-weighted average tariff when the CES aggregator function 
becomes Cobb-Douglas.  
This proposition clarifies the linkage between our MTRI estimates, using a CES aggregator 
function, and the trade-weighted index.  Since the values of the  j σ  in the GTAP data set rank 
between 2.2. and 3.8, it is not surprising that the MTRI uniform tariffs for can be rather close to 
the trade-weighted average tariffs.   
The MTRI uniform tariff is more likely to be higher than the trade-weighted average tariff the 
more elastic is the demand for tariff-constrained imports.  On the basis of empirical calculations 
with a CGE model, Anderson and Neary (2003) confirm this basic insight.
9  Our empirical 
estimate of the MTRI leads to similar conclusions.  In our specific case of a CES aggregator 
function, we can derive  the conditions under which the MTRI exceeds the trade-weighted index: 
PROPOSITION 2. In the base equilibrium (that is, with all domestic prices equal to 1), (i) the trade-
weighted average tariff overestimates the MTRI uniform tariff when σ <1 (σ denotes, the elasticity 
                                                      
9 More precisely, Anderson and Neary prove the following proposition: “The MTRI uniform tariff exceeds the trade-
weighted average tariff if: (i) the compensated arc elasticity of demand for the composite tariffed good exceeds one; 




of substitution of the CES aggregator function);  (ii) the trade-weighted average tariff 
underestimates the MTRI uniform tariff when σ > 1. 
Looking at Tables 1 and 2, it is also obvious that the MTRI and the trade-weighted index give 
very similar results when the number of tariff lines in the aggregate is very small, or when there is 
little dispersion in tariffs within an aggregate.  Figures in Table 2 show that the percentage 
variation between the MTRI and the trade-weighted average depends positively on the standard 
error of tariffs, something that is confirmed by elementary descriptive statistics.  For the 
aggregates with a large number of products, the gap between the two indexes can be very large.  
In the dairy sector, for example, the trade-weighted average underestimates the trade 
restrictiveness of the pre-URAA tariff structure by 29 percent in the US and by 9 percent in the 
EU.  This is also the case in the cattle sector and in the beverages sector in the EU 
(underestimation of 29 percent and 23 percent respectively), and in the oilseeds sector in the US 
(underestimation of 40 percent).  Overall, for six aggregate EU products out of twenty, the trade-
weighted average underestimates the MTRI by more than 10 percent. 
In brief, the trade-weighted tariff can only be a satisfactory approximation of more theoretically 
consistent indicators of market access under very specific conditions and for specific values of the 
substitution elasticities.  In more general cases, when the aggregate includes a large number of 
heterogeneous tariff lines that differ from unity, the trade-weighted average is a poor indicator of 
the restrictiveness of the tariff structure. 
                                                                                                                                                                             




5. Impact of the Uruguay Round and Counterfactual Scenarios 
The computation of the MTRI for the year 2001 makes it possible to evaluate the trade 
restrictiveness of the tariff structure that results from the URAA.  Following BFS, we also want to 
assess the relative effects of reducing the tariff average and tariff dispersion.  We simulated two 
other tariff reduction schemes in addition to the actual reduction implemented by the EU and the 
US.  The three cases are called Uruguay Round commitments, Swiss Formula, and uniform tariff 
reduction, respectively.  In the three cases, we start from the same tariff structure in 1995 (that is, 
the initial vector  pi
95 is the same for each case), but the three schemes lead to three different 
vectors for the year 2001.  These may be summarized as follows: 
•  Uruguay Round commitments. The price vector 
2000 p  is the one that results from the bound 
tariffs in year 2001.  The resulting tariff structure reflects the obligation of a 36 percent non-
weighted average reduction, but with no constraints placed on the mix of reductions to achieve 
the overall average (except that each tariff line must be reduced by at least 15 percent). 
•  Swiss Formula.  In this case, we calculate the price vector 
2001 p  that would have resulted from 
a harmonizing tariff reduction (higher tariffs subject to larger cuts as decided in the July 2004 
compromise).  The “Swiss Formula” is given in equation (15) and the parameter C is chosen 
to obtain the same non-weighted average reduction of 36 percent in tariffs as specified in the 
URAA.  Comparing the value of the MTRI-uniform tariff equivalents with those that actually 
result from URAA commitments, we can assess the impact of commitments that would have 
focused more on reducing tariff dispersion than the actual URAA tariff cuts. 
) t C /( Ct t i i i




•  Uniform (i.e. radial) tariff reduction.  Under this scheme, we assume that a uniform 36 
percent reduction is applied to all tariff lines.  This will obviously result in the same average 
reduction as specified under the URAA, but it does not permit countries to allocate the 
adjustment across commodities.  The comparison of the values of the MTRI-uniform tariff 
equivalents with those that actually result from URAA commitments therefore measures the 
magnitude of the “dilution effect” that resulted from the distribution of large and small or 
minimal cuts across tariff lines.  
Comparing the values of the MTRI-uniform tariff equivalents of the 2001 tariffs (first column in 
Table 3) with the MTRI-uniform tariff equivalents of the 1995 tariffs (third column in Table 2), 
we can assess the actual impact of the URAA in terms of market access.  The URAA indeed 
reduced each of the 20 MTRI-uniform tariffs both in the EU and in the US.  Because both the 
variance and the mean of tariffs decrease (see Tables 4 and 5), it is not surprising that the MTRI 
uniform tariff also moves in the same direction for all aggregates, as well as at the aggregate level, 
confirming that the URAA increased market access.  This is a consequence of the commitment to 
reduce each tariff line by at least 15 percent.  The absolute values of the reductions are much 
smaller in the case of the US, as could have been expected given the low values of the MTRI-
uniform tariff equivalents in the base period (see Table 2).  This is also consistent with the BFS 
results suggesting that the Uruguay Round led to a larger increase in market access in the EU than 
in the US. 
We now turn to the counterfactual scenarios in Table 3.  Overall, the results show that the various 
ways of cutting tariffs only have a very limited impact on the overall access to the US market, due 
to the low levels of tariffs in the first place.  If the Swiss Formula had been applied, the Uruguay 




the EU, the Swiss Formula would have led to a dramatic decrease in trade restrictions in highly 
protected sectors such as grains, meat, and dairy, as well as in sectors characterized by a high 
tariff dispersion, such as fruits and vegetables.  The US market also would have been more open 
at the aggregate level (see Table 4), but there are quite a few instances (e.g., rice, cereals, sugar, 
meat) where the Swiss Formula does not perform better than the uniform tariff reduction (or even 
the URAA), while this never happens in the case of the EU. 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 show that the URAA increased access to the market in a way that is very 
comparable to what would have resulted from a uniform tariff reduction in most sectors.  This 
means that both countries have not allocated tariff cuts in a very “strategic” way.  The results also 
confirm the finding that the “dilution” of the tariff reduction effect was limited in the EU, as could 
have been expected since most tariffs were cut by 36 percent and no tariff was reduced by less 
than 20 percent.  
6. Comparison with Previous Results and Sensitivity 
The comparison of the MTRI-uniform tariff equivalents between the URAA commitments and the 
counterfactual scenarios confirms BFS’s conclusions that the dilution of tariff cuts has had overall 
a limited impact on market access in the two countries.  It also confirms that harmonizing 
formulas would have resulted in much larger market access than that which occurs with the 
Uruguay Round discipline in the EU.
10  In order to check the consistency of the numerical results 
with those of BFS, we need to compute, for the entire dataset, the uniform tariff surcharge (i.e., 
                                                      
10 Remember that the tariff reduction procedure agreed upon on July 31 2004, and whose modalities are presently 





the extra rate to be applied to the non-uniform tariff vector of tariffs in period 1) which 
compensates the non-uniform change in the tariff structure (see Section 2.1).  In practice, the 
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β .  (12) 
Given the differences in the methodological approaches followed here and in BFS (2000), the 
results presented in Table 6 are surprisingly similar.  Only in the case of the Swiss Formula is the 
difference substantial, especially in the case of the EU.  This is the scenario that implies the 
largest change in tariffs; in such a case, then, the higher substitutability implied by the CES 
functional form leads to a higher impact. 
Finally, we turn to sensitivity analysis of simulation results, in order to check to what extent the 
value of the substitution elasticities affect the MTRI computation.  As it was mentioned in Section 
2.3, even though the elasticities extracted from the GTAP dataset are widely used by applied 
analysts around the world, their relevance is questionable.  There are several reasons to believe 
that the GTAP elasticities are low, compared to what is consistent with recent econometric 
estimates of import elasticities (see e.g. Hummels, 1999, Erkel-Rousse and Mirza, 2002).  In order 
to assess the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the parameters of the CES function, in 
Table 7, we compute the overall MTRI-uniform tariff equivalents, making different assumptions 
about the values of the substitution elasticities.  The elasticities are assumed to range from one-
third to three times the original values.  Even though the ranking among different scenarios 




of substitution between products, a result consistent with Proposition 2.  Since the large values of 
the index are more sensitive to the assumption on substitution, the results are more affected by 
changes in the  j σ ’s in the EU than in the US, where the agricultural sector is less protected. 
7. Conclusion 
The results of our comparison of tariff indexes and tariff reduction scenarios should be used with 
caution in policy analysis.  Indeed, our figures for tariffs after the Uruguay Round do not 
correspond to the actual EU and US protection.  The reason is that, for the purpose of comparison 
between scenarios, the world price was kept the same as in the initial (1995) situation.  In 
addition, the actual protection of EU and US agriculture is clearly overestimated because we 
focused on the MFN tariffs.  That is, we ignore preferential tariffs, which affect roughly one third 
of the value of EU imports.  However, by computing sectoral indexes; this approach provides a 
more detailed assessment of the market access improvement in the EU and the US than previous 
studies (e.g. BFS).  In addition, because we manage to approximate the MTRI uniform tariff 
without using a CGE model, we are able to take into account the large number of different tariffs 
that characterize the agricultural sector in most WTO countries.  
Our computation of the absolute level of the MTRI shows that access to the EU market is still far 
more restricted than to the US market, at least for countries that do not benefit from preferential 
treatment.  On a non-weighted basis, the overall average tariff on agricultural and food products 
was 26.7 percent in the EU and 9.7 percent in the US in 1995, while the trade-weighted average 
tariff was, respectively, 25.5 percent and 3.3 percent.  The MTRI-uniform tariff measures a degree 
of trade restrictiveness of 32.4 percent for the EU and 3.5 percent for the US (see Tables 3 and 4).  




restricted set of very particular goods.  In contrast, in the EU, most of the commodities imported 
in large quantities face significant MFN tariffs.  
On the methodological side, the MTRI uniform tariff and the trade-weighted index tend to move 
closely together when the number of commodities is small, and when the dispersion of tariffs is 
low.  In other cases, the trade-weighted index underestimates the true impact of the tariff structure 
on market access, as measured by the MTRI.  When we aggregate a large number of tariffs, or 
when the dispersion is large, the two indexes differ significantly. 
The difference that we observe between the MTRI uniform tariff and the non-weighted tariff 
average suggests that CGE or trade models that rely on aggregate tariffs constructed as simple 
averages use poor estimates of the actual tariff structure.  This bias is likely to affect a large 
number of studies, as it is common practice to construct aggregate tariffs as simple averages of the 
detailed tariffs applied by custom officers, who sometimes work at a level of detail corresponding 
to the 8, 10- or even 14-digit level (in the case of the EU).  Constructing the aggregate tariffs used 
in CGE or trade models as trade-weighted averages is more satisfactory.  However, when 
aggregating a large number of goods with a large tariff dispersion into a single commodity, this 
method also results in significant bias, usually an underestimation of the aggregate tariff, as 
measured by the MTRI. 
The computation of the absolute levels of the MTRI index makes it possible to compare the 
strategies in the allocation of tariff reductions taking into account the difference in the initial 
(bound) tariffs of the EU and the US.  We were also able to assess the consequences of 
emphasizing reductions in tariff dispersion in terms of getting a (more) level playing field 




“dilution” of tariff cuts has a limited impact on market access overall, the latter would be 
increased significantly if most protected commodities were subject to larger tariff cuts. 
The behavioural parameters make a great difference in our simulated outcomes. In the past, 
Shoven and Whalley went so far as to argue “for the establishment of an “elasticity bank” in 
which elasticity estimates would be archived, evaluated by groups of “experts” (even with a 
quality rating produced) and an on-file compendium of these values maintained.” (Shoven and 
Whalley, 1984, p. 1047).  Such a proposal could be more realistic now that we have examples of 
widely accessible global databases, and that much progress has been made in the area of 
aggregation and demand system estimation: this greatly reduces the dimensionality of the demand 
systems that can be used in trade models.
11  
In brief, this paper provides a summary measure of the Uruguay Round tariff reduction 
commitments in the EU and US, taking into account the impact of changes in a large number of 
tariff lines.  The impacts of alternative tariff-cutting procedures were evaluated using the MTRI as 
the tariff aggregator.  We were able to compute the index for particular commodity aggregates 
without using a CGE model, but we assumed a specific functional form for import demand.  Such 
an approach is easy to implement: it requires only information on tariffs, import values, and total 
expenditure on each commodity, in addition to the knowledge of the parameters of the demand 
function).  This come at a cost, namely the need to specify a tariff aggregator function, which also 
requires restrictive assumptions. 
                                                      
11 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, Lewbel (1996) developed simple tests for aggregation based on time-
series properties of price data, while Capps and Love (2002) have used these tests and showed that reliable demand 





Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1. With all domestic prices equal to 1 in the base equilibrium, equation (9) 
becomes 
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This proves the proposition. 































Assuming that there is a solution  ( ) 0 ,
0 0 = σ τ F  and ( ) 0 ,
0 0 ≠ σ τ σ F , then by the Implicit Function 
Theorem in the neighborhood of ( )
0 0,σ τ  there exists a function  ( )
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τ σ τ τ P P P  and σ > 0. Because the derivatives have opposite signs, τ 
increases with σ (at least in the case where there exists a solution).  Recalling from Proposition 1 
that the MTRI and the trade-weighted average tariff coincides for σ = 1, the result follows 
immediately. 
All this is illustrated in Figure 1, drawn in the space of uniform tariff τ and elasticity of 
substitution σ.  The trade-weighted average tariff, which corresponds to point A, is drawn as a 
straight line, as it does not change according to the vale of the elasticity of substitution.  We need 
to locate the points corresponding to the MTRI uniform tariff.  They lie on the locus F
0, which 
from the previous results must be upward sloping. At point B, which corresponds to σ = 1, we 
know from Proposition 1 that τ must be equal to the trade-weighted average tariff.  Apparently, 
when the elasticity of substitution is lower than 1, the trade-weighted average tariff overestimates 
the MTRI uniform tariff, while the opposite is true for elasticity values greater than 1. This 




calculation exceed 1 (Table 1) while the trade weighted average tariff never exceed the MTRI 
uniform tariff (Table 2). 
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 Table 1. GTAP agricultural commodities and HS-8 tariff lines 
Commodities 
1  GTAP 
Classification
Number of EU 
tariff lines 




Paddy rice  1 3  3 2.2 
Wheat  2 3  3 2.2 
Cereal grains  3 13 12 2.2 
Vegetables, fruits, nuts  4 183 186 2.2 
Oilseeds  5 31 16 2.2 
Sugar cane, sugar beet  6 3  2 2.2 
Plant based fibers  7 4  7 2.2 
Other crops  8 111 116 2.2 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses  9 14 12 2.8 
Other animal products  10 73  50 2.8 
Raw wool, cocoons and hair  12 9  17 2.8 
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, 
horses 
19 77  34 
2.2 
Other meat products  20 199  61  2.2 
Vegetable oils and fats  21 112  70  2.2 
Dairy products  22 121 118 2.2 
Processed rice  23 2  3 2.2 
Sugar  24 10  15 2.2 
Other food products  25 580 489 2.2 
Beverages and tobacco  26 87  84 3.1 
Nonfood items (goods listed in 
URAA, beyond Chapter HS 24) 
other 130  79  2.0 








average tariff (%) 
Trade-weighted 
average tariff (%) 
MTRI tariff (%)  Coefficient  of 
variation of tariffs 
 
EU US EU US EU US EU US 
Paddy rice  58.6 3.0 80.5 1.7 80.8 1.7 0.70  0.53 
Wheat  57.8  4.9 114.0 4.5 114.0 4.5  0.86 0.27 
Cereal grains  45.6 1.1 84.4 0.8 89.8 0.8 0.97  1.00 
Vegetables, fruits, 
nuts 
16.8 6.9 57.5 4.2 68.9 4.5 1.28  1.21 
Oilseeds  0  23.6  0 4.0 0 6.6 0  2.51 
Sugar cane, sugar 
beet 
40.3 2.9 14.2 3.7 14.8 3.7 1.02  0.40 
Plant based fibers  0  11.1  0 2.8 0 2.9 0  0.87 
Other crops  7.5 3.7 7.8 1.7 8.0 1.8  0.93  2.49 
Cattle, sheep, goats, 
horses 
30.2 2.1 36.2 0.1 51.5 0.0 1.52  2.36 
Other animal 
products 
4.9 1.1 2.2 0.3 2.6 0.3  1.99  2.12 
Raw wool, cocoons, 
hair 
0.1  3.5 0 5.4 0 5.4 0  1.15 
Meat: cattle, sheep, 
goats, horses 
62.1 7.0 94.0 1.1  103.2  1.1 1.02  1.67 
Other meat products  35.1 4.8 24.7 1.9 26.4 2.0 1.06  0.93 
Vegetable oils and 
fats 
14.5  4.5 5.7 3.1 6.8 3.1  1.54  1.15 
Dairy products  72.0 26.5 69.7  8.1  76.4 11.4 0.83 1.06 
Processed rice  99.2  7.8 126.4 3.4 127.6 3.4  0.52 1.08 
Sugar  39.2 26.0 63.9 13.9 67.5 15.2 0.91 1.20 
Other food products  28.0  11.8  19.7 5.6 23.7 6.0 1.02  1.71 
Beverages and 
tobacco 
15.8 7.2 28.2 2.3 36.7 2.4 1.51  1.24 
Nonfood items  8.6 3.0 3.6 2.1 3.7 2.1  1.38  1.20 




Table 3.  MTRI-uniform tariff equivalents (%) in year 2001: actual bound tariffs 






Swiss Formula  Uniform 36% 
Tariff Reduction 
 
EU US EU US EU US 
Paddy rice  51.9 1.1 23.9 1.5 52.0 1.1 
Wheat  73.0 2.5 26.2 3.3 73.0 2.9 
Cereal grains  59.9 0.3 24.1 0.7 60.7 0.5 
Vegetables, fruits, 
nuts 
58.1 3.5 21.5 2.3 51.6 3.0 
Oilseeds  0.0  5.8 0 2.1 0 5.5 
Sugar cane, sugar 
beet 
12.0  1.6 9.5 2.8 9.8 2.3 
Plant based fibers  0 2.3 0 1.9 0 1.9 
Other crops  3.4 1.3 6.0 1.0 5.3 1.2 
Cattle, sheep, goats, 
horses 
38.9 0.0 18.8 0.0 39.4 0.0 
Other animal 
products 
1.9 0.2 1.8 0.2 1.9 0.2 
Raw wool, cocoons, 
hair 
0 4.0 0 3.6 0 3.5 
Meat: cattle, sheep, 
goats, horses 
70.5 0.7 24.9 0.8 70.7 0.7 
Other meat products  17.5 0.7 13.6 1.4 17.9 1.3 
Vegetable oils and 
fats 
5.3 2.4 4.2 2.1 4.9 2.1 
Dairy products  53.0  10.4  23.0 3.0 52.1 9.0 
Processed rice  82.3 2.1 26.9 2.6 82.3 2.2 
Sugar  55.3 6.7 21.9 5.5 45.2  10.4 
Other food products  18.7 4.5 12.6 3.0 17.1 4.0 
Beverages and 
tobacco 
25.4 0.9 16.4 1.8 27.0 1.6 
Nonfood items  1.4 1.3 3.0 1.4 2.4 1.4 




Table 4. US aggregate results 
Tariff structures (ad valorem 














Base rates (year 1995)  18.3  9.7  3.5  3.3 
Bound rates UR 
commitments (year 2001) 
15.5 7.1  2.4  2.2** 
Swiss Formula scenario (year 
2001) 
3.5 3.5  1.9  1.7** 
Uniform reduction scenario 
(year 2001) 
11.7 6.2  2.4  2.1** 




Table 5. EU aggregate results  
Tariff Structures (ad valorem 














Base rates (year 1995)  38.6  26.7  32.4  25.5 
Bound rates UR 
commitments (year 2001) 
26.8 17.9  25.6  17.8** 
Swiss Formula scenario (year 
2001) 
7.8 11.1  13.4  8.4** 
Uniform reduction scenario 
(year 2001) 
24.7 17.1  24.7  16.3** 





Table 6. Comparisons of MTRI-uniform tariff surcharges with BFS rates of 
change (absolute values in %) 
European Union  United States   
Uruguay Swiss Uniform Uruguay Swiss  Uniform 
µ  5.4 16.8 6.2  1.0 1.3  1.0 
BFS 5.7  10.6  6.3  1.0  1.1  1.0 





Table 7. Sensitivity of MTRI uniform tariff to a change in the elasticities of 
substitution (in %)  
European Union  United States   
Base Uruguay Swiss Uniform Base Uruguay Swiss Uniform 
0.3*
j σ   26.0  17.4 9.3 16.6 3.2  2.2  1.8  2.1 
1.3*
j σ   36.5 29.0 14.9 28.0  3.7  2.6  2.0  2.6 
2*
j σ   45.5 36.5 17.3 35.4  4.3  3.1  2.3  3.1 
3*





Figure 1. Sensitivity of the uniform tariff equivalent to the elasticity of substitution 
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